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1 Introduction
Many industries, and in particular the provision of services of general interest,
are plagued by two categories of market imperfections: externalities and im-
perfect competition. Taxation is the usual remedy to externalities, and state
ownership and/or administered prices are the traditional responses to imperfect
competition. However, the last decades saw a growing reluctance to taxation
by governments, a general shift toward private property and the emergence of
independent agencies for the enforcement of competition rules. This trend has
been accompanied and stimulated by the rise of the so-called “new theory of
regulation”. Most contributions to the literature treat the two categories of
market imperfections separately. On the regulation of a monopoly generat-
ing externalities, two “classical” papers are Baron (1985a) and Baron (1985b).
Baron (1985a) discusses emission controls vs. pollution taxes under asymmetric
information on abatement costs. Baron (1985b) focuses on the coordination of
two regulatory agencies which control prices and pollution, respectively. If we
restrict ourselves to price regulation as the sole instrument to correct market
imperfections, a paper of reference is Oum and Tretheway (1988). It offers ex-
tended Ramsey pricing formulae in the externality generating monopoly case.
The objective of our paper is to investigate the implementation of the latter pro-
posal. By doing so we contribute to bridge the gap between public economists
and the more pragmatic concerns of policy makers.
The setup we construct encompasses a large set of environments. In our
model, externalities may depend on either the volume of services delivered by
the firm, or on the number of clients, or both.1 The analysis applies to situa-
tions in which access to services and intensity of use can be priced separately.2
This feature can be observed in most network industries, where externalities are
prevalent, and imperfect competition is ordinary.3 We offer an implementation
scheme of the extended price-cap family,4 which allows the regulator to decen-
1An instance in which the greater use of the network by some clients may negatively affect
other clients is the telecommunication industry, because of congestion effects. At the same time
the telecommunication sector is characterized by the fact a greater number of users enhances
the value of each connection to the network, a phenomenon often referred to as “network
externality”.
2For papers with two-part tariffs in models with externalities and imperfect competition,
see, among others, Kanemoto (2000), Mitomo (2001) and Blonski (2002).
3There are many examples of externality-generating activities which are performed by mo-
nopolistic (or quasi-monopolisitc) providers, and are such that access and use can be priced
separately. Public utilities which provide energy or water services typically price both access
and use, and often generate environmental externalities. Another example are parcel trans-
portation services, where customers are charged according to both the number of consignments
(each of which entails displacement of a van for collection, with consequent pollution and road
congestion) and the number (or size/weight) of parcels in each consignment.
4 See Laffont J.J. and J. Tirole (1990a, 1990b)
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tralize the second-best allocation. Our analysis shares with other recent papers
the objective to decentralize a relatively elaborate policy by means of a sim-
ple and "easy-to-use" instrument. Tanaka (2007) considers price regulation and
investment efforts. De Fraja and Iozzi (2008) study "price-and-quality" regula-
tion and Bergantino et al. (2010) examine the same problem in an oligopolistic
context. Our paper is complementary to these contributions in that, beyond
the fact that it addresses a different problem, it also considers the issue of ro-
bustness.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. In Sec-
tion 3 we present two benchmarks: the first-best and the profit-maximising price
structure. In Section 4 we characterize the socially optimum prices when the
producer is required to break-even. In Section 5 we propose a regulatory mech-
anism which allows the regulator to decentralize the corresponding second-best
allocation. Convergence and robustness are discussed and a short concluding
section completes the paper.
2 The model
A monopolist delivers a total quantity X of output to N consumers at a cost
C (X,N) . Each consumer is charged a fee equal to a for having access to the
service. The service is sold at a unit price b. A consumer of type θ ∈ [0,+∞[
obtains gross surplus Sθ (xθ,X,N) from consuming the quantity xθ when there
are N consumers whose demands add up to X.
Assumption 1 (individual surplus). Sθ (xθ,X,N) is:
a) quasi-linear;
b) twice continuously differentiable;
c) increasing and concave in xθ, i.e. (∂Sθ/∂xθ) > 0 and
¡
∂2Sθ/∂x2θ
¢
< 0;
d) increasing in θ, i.e. (∂Sθ/∂θ) > 0;
e) with marginal surplus also increasing in θ, i.e.
¡
∂2Sθ/∂xθ∂θ
¢
> 0.
Let the net surplus of a consumer of type θ be
Vθ (a, b) ≡ sup {Sθ [xθ (b,X,N) ,X,N ]− [a+ bxθ (b,X,N)] , Sθ (0,X,N)} ,
(1)
where xθ (b,X,N) denotes individual demand conditional on having access to
the service, uniquely defined by the condition5
∂Sθ (xθ,X,N)
∂xθ
= b. (2)
5Existence and uniqueness are ensured by assumptions 1b) and 1c). As income effects are
ruled out by assumption 1a), individual demand conditional on access does not depend on a.
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Let θm (a, b) be the marginal type, i.e. the type of consumers indifferent be-
tween not dealing with the firm or instead paying for access and purchasing
xθm (b,X,N), as defined by the equation
Sθm (xθm (b,X,N) ,X,N)− (a+ bxθm (b,X,N)) = Sθm (0,X,N) . (3)
Assumptions 1d) ensures that individual net surplus Vθ (a, b) is increasing in θ.6
Assumptions 1d) and 1e) guarantee uniqueness of θm.7
Given the above, consumers who find it beneficial to get access to the service
are all and only those with θ ≥ θm. Assumption 1e) also ensures8 that individual
demand is also increasing in θ, i.e. (dxθ/dθ) > 0.
If the population is distributed over types according to the density function
g (θ) , the number of consumers and aggregate demand are respectively:
N =
Z +∞
θm
g (θ) dθ. (4)
X =
Z +∞
θm
xθ(b,X,N)g (θ) dθ. (5)
3 Two benchmarks
3.1 First-best prices
We now briefly characterize the first-best allocation, using prices as decision
variables.
Maximization of social welfare, which can be written as
W (a, b) =
Z +∞
0
Vθ (a, b) g (θ) dθ + aN (a, b) + bX (a, b)− C (X (a, b) , N (a, b)) ,
(6)
6For θ < θm this is obvious as gross and net surplus coincide. For θ ≥ θm, it follows from
the envelope theorem :
d
dθ
{Sθ [xθ (b,X,N) ,X,N ]− [a+ bxθ (b,X,N)]} = ∂Sθ∂θ +
?
∂Sθ
∂xθ
− b
?
dxθ
dθ
.
7Assumption 1d) ensures that (∂Vθ/∂θ) = (∂Sθ/∂θ) (see the previous footnote).
Assumption 1e) ensures that
∂Sθ (xθ ,X,N)
∂θ
>
∂Sθ (0,X,N)
∂θ
.
8Demand monotonicity follows immediately from differentiation of equation (2) wrt θ:
∂2Sθ
∂θ∂xθ
+
∂2Sθ
∂x2θ
dxθ
dθ
= 0.
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leads to the following conditions (see Appendix):
a =
∂C
∂N
−EN , (7)
b =
∂C
∂X
−EX , (8)
where EN and EX denote themarginal external effects, that is the impact on the
aggregate surplus of, respectively, an additional connection and an additional
unit of service:
EN =
Z +∞
0
∂Sθ
∂N
g (θ) dθ, (9)
EX =
Z +∞
0
∂Sθ
∂X
g (θ) dθ. (10)
Note that EN and EX can be either positive or negative. It is immediately
seen that, in the absence of externalities, conditions (7) and (8) boil down to
plain marginal cost pricing. If instead the externality terms EN and/or EX
are negative, the first-best allocation requires access and/or consumption to be
priced above marginal cost. If this secures the provider non-negative profit, the
regulator may think of implementing the first-best allocation via direct price
control. Of course, this requires that the regulator can make use of reliable
estimates of both marginal costs CX and CN and marginal external costs (or
benefits) EX and EN . To the contrary, if the externality terms EN and/or EX
are positive, the first-best requires pricing below marginal cost, which would
most likely cause the provider to operate at a loss. Therefore in Section 4
we study a second-best situation where welfare maximization is subject to a
break-even constraint. Before doing that, however, we briefly consider the profit-
maximizing price structure, that provides us with another useful reference point.
3.2 Profit-maximising price structure
Maximization of profit, given by
Π = aN + bX − C (X,N) , (11)
leads to the following couple of Lerner formulae (see Appendix A.2):
a− eCN
a
=
1
N
, (12)
b− eCX
b
=
1
X
, (13)
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where N and X are respectively the price-elasticity of the demand for access
and the standard price-elasticity:
N = −
a
N
dN
da
, (14)
X = −
b
X
dX
db
; (15)
while eCN and eCX as defined by
eCN = ∂C∂N −
∙
b− ∂C
∂X
¸µ
dX
da
/
dN
da
¶
, (16)
eCX = ∂C∂X −
∙
a− ∂C
∂N
¸µ
dN
db
/
dX
db
¶
, (17)
are respectively the “virtual cost of connection”, that is the cost of giving access
to an additional consumer, net of the change in profit associated with the change
in sales that takes place when the number of accesses vary9 and the “virtual
cost of service” to be interpreted along similar lines.
There is a difference, however. The virtual connection cost (16) can be
rewritten so as to only make reference to magnitudes that are (at least in prin-
ciple) directly computable. More precisely10 ,
eCN = ∂C∂N −
µ
b− ∂C
∂X
¶
xθm +ExN
1− ExX
, (18)
where
ExN =
Z +∞
θm
µ
−∂2Sθ
∂x2θ
¶−1 ∂2Sθ
∂xθ∂N
g (θ) dθ,
ExX =
Z +∞
θm
µ
−∂2Sθ
∂x2θ
¶−1 ∂2Sθ
∂xθ∂X
g (θ) dθ,
indicate the change in service demand that is induced by a unit change in,
respectively, N and X.11 Observe that, if the latter magnitude is positive and
9The virtual cost of a good extends the notion of cost in that it considers both possibles
losses for the provider in addition to production cost (these losses appear with a positive sign)
and possible gains different from revenues connected with the sale of the good in question
(these gains appear with a negative sign), that ensue from selling an additional unit of the
good thanks to a change in its price (this holds, separately, for the good ‘access’ and the good
‘service’).
10The reformulation of dXda /
dN
da that permits to rewrite (16) as (18) is developed in Appendix
A.2.2).
11 In interpreting ExX observe that
?
−∂2Sθ/∂x2θ
?
is nothing but the reduction in
marginal surplus, in absolute value, that is caused by a unit increase in xθ. Thus?
−∂2Sθ/∂x2θ
?−1 ?∂2Sθ/∂xθ∂X
?
is the change in xθ that is triggered by the effect of an addi-
tional unit of X on (∂Sθ/∂xθ) .
Interpretation of ExN can be made along similar lines.
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sufficiently weak12, the term 1/ (1−ExX) is a multiplier that amplifies the
second term on the right-hand side of (18) - this term represents the correction
to be applied to marginal cost in order to obtain virtual marginal cost.
On the contrary, virtual marginal cost (17) cannot be similarly rewritten.13
However, on the condition that access price a is set to its profit-maximizing
level given by (12) , we can reformulate the optimal pricing rule (13) as follows
b− bCX
b
=
1− xθm/xcX , (19)
where x = X/N denotes average consumption,14 bCX and cX as defined by
bCX = ∂C∂X −N
Ã
∂S+θm
∂X
−
∂S−θm
∂X
!
, (20)
cX = − bX ∂ bX/∂b1−ExX , (21)
(with
³
∂ bX/∂b´ = R +∞θm (∂xθ/∂b) g (θ) dθ) are alternative definitions of virtual
cost and price elasticity respectively (see Appendix A.2.3). Condition (20) ac-
counts for the fact that, depending on the economic environment, the external
effects may impact the sole actual consumers or the whole population.15 Observe
that (21) is the price elasticity that would obtain were the number of consumers
N kept constant. In fact,
³
∂ bX/∂b´ / (1−ExX) represents the inframarginal
change in demand.
Comparing the profit maximizing price b, as defined by (19) , with the price
level that would be suggested by a naïve application of the Lerner formula (i.e.
one that fails to consider the link with the sale of access), is far from straight-
forward. If either (i) there are no externalities or (ii) agents are affected by
the externalities that derive from X irrespective of whether they are connected
and consume or not, the alternative virtual marginal cost bCX equals plain mar-
ginal cost (∂C/∂X). Absent externalities, it is also immediate that cX ≤ X .
12Of course ExX = 1 is not admissible. However, ExX > 1 is hardly admissible too. It
would indeed imply that the direct impact on X of a change in either price would trigger an
even greater indirect increase of X. So in the following we limit ourselves to situations in
which ExX < 1.
13The reason is that, differently from dNda /
dX
da , we have no closed form for
dN
db /
dX
db .
14Observe that demand monotonicity implies xθm/x < 1.
15The expressions
?
∂S+θm/∂X
?
and
?
∂S−θm/∂X
?
denote the marginal effect of total con-
sumption on, respectively, the marginal consumer who chooses to access the services and the
marginal consumer who does not. If the externality extends to the whole population, their
difference amounts to zero and the virtual cost ?CX does not differ from the standard marginal
cost (∂C/∂X) . If, on the contrary, external effects impact the sole consumers, this is to be
considered as part of the cost of delivering services.
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However, the ranking of cX/ (1− xθm/x) and X remains ambiguous since the
multiplier 1/ (1− xθm/x) is greater than 1, so even in this simple case we can-
not reach neat conclusions. This contrasts with the determination of the access
price a, as defined by (12): in the absence of externalities, eCN is always smaller
than (∂C/∂N) , so the profit maximising access price a is always lower than the
level that would result from a naïve application of the Lerner formula.
Notice also that in the first-best formulae the externalities enter through the
terms EX and EN , that express them in terms of impacts on social surplus,
while here they operate through the terms ExN and ExX , that measure the
corresponding impacts on demand (which is what concerns a profit-maximizing
provider).
4 Second-best prices
We now turn to the second-best solution which consists in maximizingW subject
to the producer break even constraint Π ≥ 0. Obviously this only makes sense
under the following:
Assumption 2 First-best prices as defined by (7) and (8) do not allow the firm
to break-even.
Let L be the Lagrangean expression associated with the second-best problem,
while λ is the multiplier of the break-even constraint. From Assumption 2 we
know that λ > 0, i.e. the constraint is binding. The following first-order
conditions hold:
∂L
∂a
=
Z +∞
0
∙
∂Sθ
∂X
dX
da
+
∂Sθ
∂N
dN
da
− 1θ≥θm
¸
g (θ) dθ
+ (1 + λ)
∙
N +
µ
a− ∂C
∂N
¶
dN
da
+
µ
b− ∂C
∂X
¶
dX
da
¸
= 0, (22)
∂L
∂b
=
Z +∞
0
∙
∂Sθ
∂X
dX
db
+
∂Sθ
∂N
dN
db
− xθ (a, b) 1θ≥θm
¸
g (θ) dθ
+ (1 + λ)
∙
X +
µ
a− ∂C
∂N
¶
dN
db
+
µ
b− ∂C
∂X
¶
dX
db
¸
= 0. (23)
Condition (22)-(23) can be rewritten as (see Appendix A.3)
a− eCN = λ
1 + λ
a
N
− 1
1 + λ
∙
EN +EX
µ
dX
da
/
dN
da
¶¸
, (24)
b− eCX = λ
1 + λ
b
X
− 1
1 + λ
∙
EX +EN
µ
dN
db
/
dX
db
¶¸
. (25)
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As shown in Appendix A.2.2,
dX
da
/
dN
da
=
xθm +ExN
1−ExX
.
Thus equation (24) can be rewritten more explicitly as
a− eCN = λ
1 + λ
a
N
− 1
1 + λ
µ
EN +EX
xθm +ExN
1−ExX
¶
. (26)
Equation (25) has the drawback that it rests on the ratio
¡dN
db /
dX
db
¢
which does
not admit an explicit expression. However, if a is indeed optimally chosen by
the monopolist, the latter condition can be rewritten as (See Appendix A.3):
b− bCX = λ
1 + λ
µ
1− xθm
X/N
¶
bcX − 11 + λ
∙
EX −N
µ
∂S+θ
∂X
− ∂S
−
θ
∂X
¶¸
. (27)
The second-best allocation is thus defined by means of equations (26) and
(27) , that can be interpreted along the lines proposed in the previous sections.16
Yet, these formulae do not lend themselves to handy application either. Indeed,
the regulator should avail itself of reliable estimates of the not so obvious mag-
nitudes there contained in order to compute second-best prices. So in the next
section we propose a price-cap formula that makes implementation of the second
best easier.
5 Decentralization and global price-cap
The previous section presents the pricing policy (a∗, b∗) that would be chosen
by a welfare maximizing (and well-informed) regulator subject to a break-even
constraint. We now show that in the case of a profit-maximizing provider, the
second-best can be obtained through a global price-cap scheme - i.e. a constraint
imposing an upper limit on the weighted average of the two prices.
5.1 Ideal price-cap
The provider is allowed to choose prices a and b so as to maximize its profits,
defined in (11) , under the following regulatory constraint
αa+ βb ≤ p¯+ ϕN + ψX, (28)
16These second-best conditions remind us of Oum and Tretheway (1988, p. 312), who write:
“the markups are computed on the basis of marginal private costs and a fraction of external
costs”. This applies especially to formulations (24) and (25) where, differently from ?CN and
?CX , the external effects are divided by 1 + λ.
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where the weights α, β, ϕ, ψ and the cap p¯ are exogenously given to it. The main
idea behind this "extended version" of the usual price-cap approach is that, if
N or X generate positive (resp. negative) external effects, the firm should be
rewarded (resp. punished) for their provision. This is done by relaxing (resp.
strengthening) the price-cap p¯.
We denote by M the Lagrangean of the provider’s maximisation problem
and by μ the multiplier associated to the constraint (28).
First-order conditions of the maximization problem are:
∂M
∂a
= N +
µ
a− ∂C
∂N
+ μϕ
¶
dN
da
+
µ
b− ∂C
∂X
+ μψ
¶
dX
da
− μα = 0,(29)
∂M
∂b
= X +
µ
a− ∂C
∂N
+ μϕ
¶
dN
db
+
µ
b− ∂C
∂X
+ μψ
¶
dX
db
− μβ = 0.(30)
Equation (29) rewrites simply as (see appendix A.4):
a− eCN = ³1− μ αN ´ aN − μ
µ
ϕ+ ψ
xθm +ExN
1−ExX
¶
. (31)
If a is optimally chosen by the firm according to (31) , equation (30) rewrites
(See Appendix A.4):
b− ∂C
∂X
+ μψ +N
³
1− μ α
N
´µ∂S+θ
∂X
− ∂S
−
θ
∂X
¶
=
µ
1− μ β
X
¶ ∙
1−
µ
1− μα/N
1− μβ/X
¶
xθm
X/N
¸
bcX (32)
The second-best is only obtained if equations (22)—(23) are solved by the
couple (a, b) that is defined by (31) and (32). Comparing the latter equa-
tions, respectively, with (26) and (27) , that determine the second-best solution
(a∗, b∗), we see that this is the case when
μ =
1
1 + λ∗
, (33)
and
α = N (a∗, b∗) , β = X (a∗, b∗) , ϕ = E∗N , ψ = E
∗
X , (34)
where the upperscript ∗ stands to indicate that the values are those attached to
the second-best optimum.
By definition when a = a∗ and b = b∗, the provider makes zero-profits.
Conversely, if the cap p¯ is set in such a way that the provider can just break
even and if at the same time the weights are set according to (34), then (33)
must also be satisfied. Formally:
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Proposition 1 (Ideal price-cap) The price cap defined by (28) and (34) ,with
p¯ such that the firm breaks even but cannot make strictly positive profits, leads
a profit-maximizing monopolist to set prices at their second-best levels defined
by (26) and (27) .
Using (34), the price cap formula (28) becomes, at optimum,
(a−E∗N )N (a∗, b∗) + (b−E∗X)X (a∗, b∗) ≤ p¯. (35)
This formulation shows that in the ideal price cap formula the provider’s
earnings are to be computed using accounting prices that take into consideration
marginal external effects. Imagine that, as in the telecom example mentioned at
the beginning, increasing the number of accesses causes external benefits (due to
the enlargement of the network), while increasing the quantity of service causes
external costs (due to congestion). According to (35), the provider’s revenue
from selling accesses is to be computed at a discounted price, while the sale of
services is to be computed at a surcharge: the price cap constraint is so designed
as to push the provider to sell more connections and fewer calls in the above
mentioned circumstances than in the absence of externalities.
A comment is in order concerning the informational requirements of the
ideal price cap. According to (34) the weights associated with the externality-
generating variables N and X, that is ϕ = E∗N and ψ = E
∗
X , are their external
marginal costs/benefits. Clearly, if externalities are to be taken into account by
the regulator, EX and EN are the most straightforward magnitudes one can
think of. The weights attached to prices (α and β), instead, are just market de-
mands for the corresponding goods, a standard result for price-cap schemes. So,
differently from the direct computation of the second-best allocation through
(26) and (27), here the regulator does not need to have any knowledge of prop-
erties of demand functions such as price elasticities N and X or demand mul-
tipliers 1/ (1−ExN ) and 1/ (1−ExX), but only of demand levels N and X at
the (constrained) optimum.
Yet, one can object that these are not known to the regulator either. How-
ever, beside simplicity the price cap approach offers a further implementation
advantage: it lends itself to being applied iteratively, with parameters being ad-
justed at each step so as to obtain better and better approximations to the ideal
formula. Here below we propose an iterative formula for the extended price cap
considered above, and prove its monotonic convergence under reasonable as-
sumptions. This allows us to presume that, even if some of these assumptions
were violated to a limited extent, convergence to the second best would still
occur.
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5.2 Implementation
We make the following assumptions. Regarding externalities:
Assumption 3 External effects are linear in N and X, respectively. Formally
EN (N,X) = EN and EX (N,X) = EX .
Regarding the regulator:
Assumption 4
(a) In each period t = 1, 2... the regulatory agency knows prices, quantities
and total costs of the previous period - i.e. at−1, bt−1,Xt−1 ≡ X (at−1, bt−1) ,
Nt−1 ≡ N (at−1, bt−1) , and Ct−1 ≡ C (Xt−1,Nt−1) .
(b) The regulation takes the form of the following constraint on prices a and b
aNt−1 + bXt−1 ≤ Ct−1 +EN [N (a, b)−Nt−1] (36)
+EX [X (a, b)−Xt−1] .
Regarding the provider:
Assumption 5
(a) In period 0, the last before constraint (36) applies, profit is non-negative;
formally Π0 ≡ a0N0 + b0X0 − C0 ≥ 0.
(b) In each period t = 1, 2... the provider maximizes current profit.
(c) Demand and cost functions, X (a, b) , N (a, b) and C (X,N) are known to
the provider, and do not change over time.
Finally, regarding the net benefits derived by the population from the ser-
vices delivered by the monopolist:
Assumption 6 Net consumer surplus minus external effects as defined by
Z (a, b) =
Z +∞
0
Vθ (a, b) g (θ) dθ
−ENN (a, b)−EXX (a, b)
is a convex function of prices a and b.
According to Assumption 5 (b), the provider maximizes current profits my-
opically, ignoring the influence that its current choices exert on how the pa-
rameters of the regulatory constraint are set in the following period. Together
with Assumptions 4, 5 (a) and 5 (c), this implies that one should only observe
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nonnegative profits. In fact, by keeping prices unchanged the provider ensures
the same profit as in the previous period, and in general can do better. Notice
that in case profit were negative and there were suspects of strategic price ma-
nipulation, the regulator could stick to the current parameters of the price cap
constraint until profits resume positive, as suggested by Vogelsang and Finsinger
(1979).
In conventional demand analysis, surplus convexity is implied by the hy-
pothesis that demand is decreasing in prices. As emphasized by De Fraja and
Iozzi (2008), surplus convexity cannot be warranted in more complex environ-
ments - like theirs or the one of the present paper, where complexity is due
to externalities. However, the way Z is defined makes Assumption 6 close to
the usual hypothesis that (absent externalities) consumer surplus is a convex
function of prices.
The following proposition holds.
Proposition 2 (Implementation) Under Assumptions - 4- 5 - 6 the regu-
latory mechanism (36) yields a pattern of prices that
(i) causes social welfare to increase from period to period, and
(ii) converges to the (second-best) social optimum.
(Proof. See Appendix A.4).
Observe that perfect foresight rather than myopia would not alter the re-
sults substantially: it would only make convergence slower. See Vogelsang and
Finsinger (1979), p.167. In fact, a forward-looking firm can indeed induce the
regulator to slack the regulatory constraint in the next period, but this can only
be done by deviating from profit maximization in the current period. Moreover,
the firm can only prevent the regulator from fastening the constraint in the next
period by making zero profits in the current period. Thus, in the end, it is not in
the firm’s interest to block entirely the operation of the mechanism that drives
it to the second best.
5.3 Robustness
A natural question in a world of imperfect information is whether the regulatory
mechanism proposed in (36) is robust to small errors in estimates of marginal
externalities EN and EX (remember that the optimal choice of parameters as
ϕ = E∗N and ψ = E
∗
X). We prove the following:
Proposition 3 (Robustness) Let WR (ϕ,ψ) denote the level of social welfare
obtained by applying the regulatory mechanism proposed above, where ϕ and ψ
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are the regulatory parameters defined in (28). For the parameter values defined
in it is (34) it is:
dWR
dϕ
= 0 and
dWR
dψ
= 0.
(Proof. See Appendix A.4).17
This shows that, were the parameters of the price cap incorrect, due to
small errors by the regulator in estimating the intensity of externalities, the
consequences for the level of social welfare are of the second order.
6 Concluding comments
Since the 70s the literature has been quite pessimistic as to the possibility of
remedying externalities in practice.18 See among others Diamond and Mirrlees
(1973), and Littlechild (1975), as to consumption externalities and Green and
Sheshinski (1976), and Barnett (1980), as to production externalities. The gen-
eral picture nowadays does not appear to be much more optimistic. As reminded
by Cornes and Sandler (1996), the Arrowian approach to externality (incom-
plete markets) and the Pigouvian remedies that followed (tax and subsidies) are
very much rooted in competitive equilibrium analysis. As a consequence, they
display intrinsic limitations in circumstances, like the one we consider, where
there is imperfect competition. Furthermore, in these environments informa-
tional problems are particularly severe as imperfect markets also result in a loss
of information regarding both consumers’ preferences and producer technology.
In this paper, building on the “new theory of regulation”, we prove that,
despite the complexity of optimal allocations, these can be decentralized by
means of a simple and informationally parsimonious regulatory scheme, namely,
an extended price-cap. This also evidences that taxation is by no means the
only way to correct for externalities.
More precisely, we consider a monopolistic service provider, assuming that
both access and intensity of use can be priced. Externalities may depend on
aggregate consumption, number of users, or both. The setup is general enough
to allow non-consumers to be affected by the externality. Firstly, we characterize
various allocations of interest, including the second-best, defined as the social
optimum when the monopolist is subject to the break-even constraint. Secondly
17Note that the linearity of external effects is not needed to obtain this robustness result.
18For instance Littlechild (1975) declares: “An attempt has been made, however, to charac-
terize the optimal tariffs in terms of operational parameters, such as demand elasticities with
respect to price, income, and the number of other subscribers in the system (...) In practice,
things are much more complex than assumed here (...) It seems to me doubtful whether the
present methods can be extended to give useful insights.”
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and more importantly, we propose an original regulatory policy of the price-cap
category in order to decentralize the second best solution. While direct com-
putation of the second best is quite complex, the proposed mechanism appears
to be quite simple. Moreover, it only relies on standard accounting data and
direct estimates of marginal external effects generated by aggregate consump-
tion and the number of users. An additional advantage of this mechanism is its
transparency. The estimates of its key parameters, the above mentioned mar-
ginal externalities, and the criteria for working them out, lend themselves quite
straightforwardly to public debate. We also study an iterative application of
the price cap that allows for practical implementation, and provide conditions
for the process of parameter adjustment to ensure convergence to the second
best. Finally, we show that the mechanism is robust as to the possibility that
the regulator may rely on incorrect estimates of externalities. More precisely,
we prove that such errors only exert second order effects on social welfare.
A promising extension of the analysis carried out in these pages is inclusion
of taxes and subsidies into the regulatory framework considered here. We leave
it for future research.
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A Appendix
A.1 First-Best Allocation
The impacts of the two prices on individual net surplus (or indirect utility
function) are respectively
dVθ
da
=
∂Sθ
∂X
dX
da
+
∂Sθ
∂N
dN
da
− 1θ≥θm ,
dVθ
db
=
∂Sθ
∂X
dX
db
+
∂Sθ
∂N
dN
db
− 1θ≥θmxθ (a, b) .
Differentiation of (6) with respect to a and b and simple manipulations lead to
the following FOCs:
dW
da
=
µ
a− ∂C
∂N
+ EN
¶
dN
da
+
µ
b− ∂C
∂X
+EX
¶
dX
da
= 0
dW
db
=
µ
a− ∂C
∂N
+ EN
¶
dN
db
+
µ
b− ∂C
∂X
+EX
¶
dX
db
= 0.
Conditions (9)and (10) are an obvious solution of the system above.
A.2 Profit maximizing prices
A.2.1 Lerner formulae
Maximization of (11) gives rise to the following system of F.O.Cs:
dΠ
da
= N +
µ
a− ∂C
∂N
¶
dN
da
+
µ
b− ∂C
∂X
¶
dX
da
= 0, (37)
dΠ
db
= X +
µ
a− ∂C
∂N
¶
dN
db
+
µ
b− ∂C
∂X
¶
dX
db
= 0. (38)
Equation (37) can be written as
a− ∂C
∂N
+
µ
b− ∂C
∂X
¶
dX
da
/
dN
da
=
a
N
, (39)
Thanks to definition (16), condition (39) can be written as (12).
Similarly, equation (38) can be written as
b− ∂C
∂X
+
µ
a− ∂C
∂N
¶
dN
db
/
dX
db
=
b
X
, (40)
whence (13).
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A.2.2 Computation of dXda /
dN
da .
A change in a induces a shift in the marginal type θm, hence a change in the
number of consumers N. More precisely, we know from equation (4) that
dN
da
= −g (θm)
dθm
da
, (41)
where, from the monotonicity of Vθ, the derivative (dθm/da) is certainly positive.
As already pointed out, due to quasi-linearity the access fee a has no direct
impact on the individual demand of infra-marginal consumers. However it does
impact on xθ (b,X,N) indirectly as a consequence of the externalities. To assess
this impact we differentiate (2) wrt a, obtaining:
dxθ
da
=
µ
−∂2Sθ
∂x2θ
¶−1 ∙ ∂2Sθ
∂xθ∂X
dX
da
+
∂2Sθ
∂xθ∂N
dN
da
¸
. (42)
We now turn to aggregate demand.
By definition,
dX
da
=
Z +∞
θm
dxθ
da
g (θ) dθ − g (θm)xθm
dθm
da
,
whence, thanks to (42) and (41) , we obtain
dX
da
=
xθm +ExN
1−ExX
dN
da
. (43)
A.2.3 Computation of the modified Lerner formula for price b
We first show that
dX
db
=
1
1−ExX
∂ bX
∂b
+
µ
xθm +ExN
1−ExX
¶
dN
db
; (44)
We then establish that:
dN
db
/
dN
da
= xθm −
µ
∂S+θ
∂X
− ∂S
−
θ
∂X
¶
1
1−ExX
∂ bX
∂b
, (45)
before to establish the lerner formula equation (19) .
Decomposition of dXdb : The effect of a change in the price b on the con-
sumption of X can be decomposed into a marginal effect and an infra-marginal
effect:
dX
db
= −xθmg (θm)
dθm
db
+
Z +∞
θm
dxθ
db
g (θ) dθ. (46)
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From equation (4), we know that the first term of the right-hand side of (46)
writes
−xθmg (θm)
dθm
db
= xθm
dN
db
. (47)
The second term represents the impact of a change in b on infra-marginal con-
sumption. It can in turn be decomposed into a direct and an indirect effect, the
latter resulting from the presence of externalities. Indeed, differentiating with
respect to b equation (2) that defines individual consumption yields
1 =
∂2Sθ
∂x2θ
dxθ
db
+
∂2Sθ
∂xθ∂X
dX
db
+
∂2Sθ
∂xθ∂N
dN
db
.
It follows that
dxθ
db
=
µ
−∂2Sθ
∂x2θ
¶−1 ∙
−1 +
µ
∂2Sθ
∂xθ∂X
¶
dX
db
+
µ
∂2Sθ
∂xθ∂N
¶
dN
db
¸
so that, by introducing
∂ bX
∂b
=
Z +∞
θm
∂xθ
∂b
g (θ) dθ =
Z +∞
θm
µ
∂2Sθ
∂x2θ
¶−1
g (θ) dθ,
we have Z +∞
θm
dxθ
db
g (θ) dθ =
∂ bX
∂b
+ExX
dX
db
+ExN
dN
db
. (48)
The two remaining terms on the right-hand side of (48) reflect the indirect effect
of a change in b on the demand of infra-marginal consumers.
Finally, plugging (47) and (48) into (46) , yields equation (44).
Computation of dNdb /
dN
da : As a first step we differentiate wrt a equation (3)
that defines the marginal type θm, obtaining
∂S+θ
∂xθ
dxθm
da
+
∂S+θ
∂X
dX
da
+
∂S+θ
∂N
dN
da
+
∂S+θ
∂θ
dθm
da
−
µ
1 + b
dxθm
da
¶
=
∂S−θ
∂X
dX
da
+
∂S−θ
∂N
dN
da
+
∂S−θ
∂θ
dθm
da
where S+θ stands for Sθm (xθm ,X,N) , i.e. the gross surplus of the marginal con-
sumer who actually gets access to the service, while S−θ stands for Sθm (0,X,N) ,
i.e. the gross (and net at the same time) surplus of the marginal consumer who
actually opts for not accessing the service. By the envelope theorem, this boils
down to:µ
∂S+θ
∂X
− ∂S
−
θ
∂X
¶
dX
da
+
µ
∂S+θ
∂N
− ∂S
−
θ
∂N
¶
dN
da
+
µ
∂S+θ
∂θ
− ∂S
−
θ
∂θ
¶
dθm
da
= 1. (49)
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Similarly, differentiating wrt b equation (3) gives
∂S+θ
∂x
dxθm
db
+
∂S+θ
∂X
dX
db
+
∂S+θ
∂N
dN
db
+
∂S+θ
∂θ
dθm
db
−
µ
xθm + b
dxθm
db
¶
=
∂S−θ
∂X
dX
db
+
∂S−θ
∂N
dN
db
+
∂S−θ
∂θ
dθm
db
henceµ
∂S+θ
∂X
− ∂S
−
θ
∂X
¶
dX
db
+
µ
∂S+θ
∂N
− ∂S
−
θ
∂N
¶
dN
db
+
µ
∂S+θ
∂θ
− ∂S
−
θ
∂θ
¶
dθm
db
= xθm .
(50)
From (41) and (43) , equation (49) rewrites:
∙
xθm +ExN
1−ExX
µ
∂S+θ
∂X
− ∂S
−
θ
∂X
¶
+
µ
∂S+θ
∂N
− ∂S
−
θ
∂N
¶
− 1
g (θm)
µ
∂S+θ
∂θ
− ∂S
−
θ
∂θ
¶¸
dN
da
= 1.
From (47) and (44) ,equation (50) rewrites:
xθm =
µ
∂S+θ
∂X
− ∂S
−
θ
∂X
¶
1
1−ExX
∂ bX
∂b
+
∙
xθm +ExN
1−ExX
µ
∂S+θ
∂X
− ∂S
−
θ
∂X
¶
+
µ
∂S+θ
∂N
− ∂S
−
θ
∂N
¶
− 1
g (θm)
µ
∂S+θ
∂θ
− ∂S
−
θ
∂θ
¶¸
dN
db
hence equation (45) .
The final step: Thanks to equation (44) we can rewrite the FOC (38) as
0 = X +
µ
b− ∂C
∂X
¶Ã
1
1−ExX
∂ bX
∂b
!
+
µ
a− ∂C
∂N
+
µ
b− ∂C
∂X
¶
xθm + ExN
1−ExX
¶
dN
db
(51)
If the price a is set to its profit-maximizing level (12) with the virtual connection
cost formulated as in (18), the previous equation boils down to:
0 = X +
µ
b− ∂C
∂X
¶Ã
1
1−ExX
∂ bX
∂b
!
−N
µ
dN
db
/
dN
da
¶
. (52)
Plugging in equation (45) we obtain
0 = X+
µ
b− ∂C
∂X
¶Ã
1
1−ExX
∂ bX
∂b
!
−N
"
xθm −
µ
∂S+θ
∂X
− ∂S
−
θ
∂X
¶
1
1−ExX
∂ bX
∂b
#
,
whence
b−
"
∂C
∂X
−N
Ã
∂S+θm
∂X
−
∂S−θm
∂X
!#
=
(1− ExX) (Nxθm −X)
∂ bX/∂b ,
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that is
b−
∙
∂C
∂X −N
µ
∂S+θm
∂X −
∂S−θm
∂X
¶¸
b
=
1− xθm/ (X/N)h
− bX
∂ ?X/∂b
1−ExX
i .
Using the definitions of bCX and cX and x one immediately obtains equation
(19) .
A.3 Second_best
A.3.1 Computation of equation (24)
Making use of notations (10) and (9), the FOC condition (22) yields directly
−λN =
∙
EN + (1 + λ)
µ
a− ∂C
∂N
¶¸
dN
da
+
∙
EX + (1 + λ)
µ
b− ∂C
∂X
¶¸
dX
da
(53)
from which, dividing by (dN/da), rearranging and using the definition (14), we
obtain
λ
a
N
=
µ
EN +EX
dX/da
dN/da
¶
+ (1 + λ)
∙µ
a− ∂C
∂N
¶
+
µ
b− ∂C
∂X
¶
dX/da
dN/da
¸
.
Another division by (1 + λ) and recourse to definition (16) yields equation (24) .
A.3.2 Computation of equation (27)
Making use of notations (10) and (9), the FOC condition (23) yields directly
−λX =
∙
EN + (1 + λ)
µ
a− ∂C
∂N
¶¸
dN
db
+
∙
EX + (1 + λ)
µ
b− ∂C
∂X
¶¸
dX
db
,
(54)
whence, using (44) we obtain:
−λX = (1 + λ)
∙µ
b− ∂C
∂X
¶
+
1
1 + λ
EX
¸
1
1−ExX
∂ bX
∂b
+
µ
EN +EX
xθm +ExN
1−ExX
¶
dN
db
+(1 + λ)
∙
a− ∂C
∂N
+
µ
b− ∂C
∂X
¶µ
xθm +ExN
1−ExX
¶¸
dN
db
.
Thanks to (53) , the later equation rewrites first as
+
µ
EN +EX
xθm +ExN
1−ExX
¶
+(1 + λ)
∙
a− ∂C
∂N
+
µ
b− ∂C
∂X
¶µ
xθm +ExN
1−ExX
¶¸
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−λX = (1 + λ)
∙µ
b− ∂C
∂X
¶
+
1
1 + λ
EX
¸
1
1−ExX
∂ bX
∂b
− λN
µ
dN
db
/
dN
da
¶
and then, using (45) , as
−λX = (1 + λ)
∙µ
b− ∂C
∂X
¶
+
1
1 + λ
EX
¸
1
1−ExX
∂ bX
∂b
−λN
"
xθm −
µ
∂S+θ
∂X
− ∂S
−
θ
∂X
¶
1
1−ExX
∂Xˆ
∂b
#
.
Using the price elasticity of infra-marginal consumers cX defined in (21) and
dividing by (1 + λ) 11−ExX
∂Xˆ
∂b , we get:
b− ∂C
∂X
+
1
1 + λ
EX +
λ
1 + λ
N
µ
∂S+θ
∂X
− ∂S
−
θ
∂X
¶
=
λ
1 + λ
µ
1− xθm
X/N
¶
bcX
Equation (27) is obtained by plugging in the definition of virtual marginal
cost (20) .
A.4 Regulation and Global Price Cap
A.4.1 Computation of equation (31)
By using (43) , equation (29) rewrites directly as:
−N+μ
∙
α−
µ
ϕ+ ψ
xθm +ExN
1−ExX
¶
dN
da
¸
=
∙
a− ∂C
∂N
+
µ
b− ∂C
∂X
¶
xθm +ExN
1−ExX
¸
dN
da
.
(55)
It follows that
a− ∂C
∂N
+
µ
b− ∂C
∂X
¶
xθm +ExN
1−ExX
=
³
1− μ α
N
´ a
N
− μ
µ
ϕ+ ψ
xθm +ExN
1−ExX
¶
.
Using the definition of virtual connection cost eCN (16) , one gets directly (31) .
A.4.2 Computation of equation (32)
Plugging equations (44) and (45)into equation (30) gives
0 = X − μβ +
µ
b− ∂C
∂X
+ μψ
¶Ã
1
1−ExX
∂ bX
∂b
!
+
∙
a− ∂C
∂N
+ μϕ+
µ
b− ∂C
∂X
+ μψ
¶
xθm +ExN
1−ExX
¸
dN
db
, or else
0 = X − μβ +
µ
b− ∂C
∂X
+ μψ
¶Ã
1
1−ExX
∂ bX
∂b
!
+
∙
a− ∂C
∂N
+
µ
b− ∂C
∂X
¶
xθm +ExN
1−ExX
+
µ
μϕ+ μψ
xθm +ExN
1−ExX
¶¸
·
Ã
xθm −
µ
∂S+θ
∂X
− ∂S
−
θ
∂X
¶"
1
1−ExX
∂ bX
∂b
#!
dN
da
.
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Using (55) , the square parenthesis can be replaced by N
¡
1− μ αN
¢
/
¡dN
da
¢
, so,
after rearrangement, one obtains
0 = X
∙µ
1− μ β
X
¶
−
³
1− μ α
N
´ xθm
X/N
¸
+
µ
b− ∂C
∂X
+ μψ +N
³
1− μ α
N
´µ∂S+θ
∂X
− ∂S
−
θ
∂X
¶¶Ã
1
1−ExX
∂ bX
∂b
!
.
Dividing both sides by 11−ExX
∂ ?X
∂b and using (21) yields (32) .
A.4.3 Proof of Proposition 2
We first prove (i). Assumption 4 (c) ensures us that
∂Z
∂a
= −N and ∂Z
∂b
= −X.19 (55)
So, thanks to Assumption 6 it is
Vt − Vt−1 ≥ E0N [Nt −Nt−1] +E0X [Xt −Xt−1]
−Nt−1 (at − at−1)−Xt−1 (bt − bt−1) , (56)
where Vt =
R +∞
0
Vθ (at, bt) g (θ) dθ denotes net consumer surplus at date t.20 If
the regulatory constraint (36) holds true, it must be the case that
(at − at−1)Nt−1 + (bt − bt−1)Xt−1 ≤
−Πt−1 +E0N [Nt −Nt−1] +E0X [Xt −Xt−1] , (57)
or
E0N [Nt −Nt−1]+E0X [Xt −Xt−1] ≥ − (at − at−1)Nt−1−(bt − bt−1)Xt−1+Πt−1
(58)
19 In all cases,
∂Z
∂a
= −N +
?
EN − E0N
? dN
da
+
?
EX −E0X
? dX
da
,
∂Z
∂b
= −X +
?
EN −E0N
? dN
db
+
?
EX −E0X
? dX
db
.
In the particular case where EN = E¯N = E0N and EX = E¯X = E
0
X , it is
∂Z
∂a
= −N and ∂Z
∂b
= −X.
20 Indeed, convexity of Z (a, b) implies that
Zt − Zt−1 ≥
∂Z
∂a
?
t−1
(at − at−1) +
∂Z
∂b
?
t−1
(bt − bt−1) .
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Substituting (58) into (56) yields
Vt − Vt−1 ≥ Πt−1, (59)
so it is
Wt −Wt−1 ≡ Πt −Πt−1 + Vt − Vt−1 ≥ Πt ≥ 0 : (60)
social welfare Wt does indeed increase from period to period.
Point (ii) results from the fact that increasing series that are bounded from
above must converge. From (59) and profit positivity we know that the series Vt
is also increasing.We know that bothWt and Vt are bounded from above, as well.
So both series converge. The same can be said of their difference Πt = Wt−
Vt (which is not necessarily monotonic). By (60) , it must be the case that lim
Πt→+∞ = 0.
Under Assumption 4 - 5, the provider sets the prices at and bt as to maximize
its profits as defined in (11) , under the global price-cap constraint (36) that can
be rewritten as:
αat + βbt ≤ p¯+ ϕN (at, bt) + ψX (at, bt) , (61)
where α = Nt−1, β = Xt−1, ϕ = E0N , ψ = E
0
X and p¯ = Ct−1 − E0NNt−1 −
E0XXt−1. This says that the prices (at, bt) satisfy both (31) and (32) together
with Π (at, bt) = Πt. If the policy (a∗, b∗) is well defined, there is a unique
solution to the system (31)-(32) that also satisfies Π (a, b) = 0. As a result,
the sequence of prices (at, bt) converges to the socially optimal prices defined in
section 4.
A.4.4 Robustness
Let
¡
aR, bR
¢
define the prices of, respectively, N and X that are set by the
profit-maximising monopolist when (i) it is subject to the regulatory constraint
(28) and (ii) it exactly breaks-even. Obviously, both prices (and quantities N
and X as well) depend upon the parameters in the cap, in particular ϕ and ψ.
We denote by WR (ϕ,ψ) social welfare as a function of these two parameters,
defined as WR (ϕ,ψ) = W
¡
aR, bR
¢
. Similarly, ΠR (ϕ,ψ) denotes firm’s profits
in such a situation. In what follows, we investigate the impact upon social
welfare of small changes in ϕ and/or ψ.
By definition, if the firm exactly breaks even, ΠR (ϕ,ψ) ≡ 0. Differentiating,
one gets
dΠR
dϕ
=
∂ΠR
∂a
daR
dϕ
+
∂ΠR
∂b
dbR
dϕ
= 0,
dΠR
dψ
=
∂ΠR
∂a
daR
dψ
+
∂ΠR
∂b
dbR
dψ
= 0.
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We also know that (∂Π/∂a) and (∂Π/∂b) can be decomposed as follows:
∂Π
∂a
= N +
µ
a− ∂C
∂N
¶
dN
da
+
µ
b− ∂C
∂X
¶
dX
da
,
∂Π
∂b
= X +
µ
a− ∂C
∂N
¶
dN
db
+
µ
b− ∂C
∂X
¶
dX
db
.
Therefore it is:
0 =
∙
N +
µ
a− ∂C
∂N
¶
dN
da
+
µ
b− ∂C
∂X
¶
dX
da
¸
daR
dϕ
+
∙
X +
µ
a− ∂C
∂N
¶
dN
db
+
µ
b− ∂C
∂X
¶
dX
db
¸
dbR
dϕ
(62)
and
0 =
∙
N +
µ
a− ∂C
∂N
¶
dN
da
+
µ
b− ∂C
∂X
¶
dX
da
¸
daR
dψ
+
∙
X +
µ
a− ∂C
∂N
¶
dN
db
+
µ
b− ∂C
∂X
¶
dX
db
¸
dbR
dψ
. (63)
Similarly, changes in total welfare can be decomposed in two parts:
dWR
dϕ
=
∂WR
∂a
daR
dϕ
+
∂WR
∂b
dbR
dϕ
,
dWR
dψ
=
∂WR
∂a
daR
dψ
+
∂WR
∂b
dbR
dψ
,
where
∂W
∂a
=
µ
a− ∂C
∂N
+EN
¶
dN
da
+
µ
b− ∂C
∂X
+EX
¶
dX
da
,
∂W
∂b
=
µ
a− ∂C
∂N
+EN
¶
dN
db
+
µ
b− ∂C
∂X
+EX
¶
dX
db
.
Now, since the firm is subject to regulation, there exists a real parameter μ
such that
N +
µ
a− ∂C
∂N
¶
dN
da
+
µ
b− ∂C
∂X
¶
dX
da
= μ
∙
α− ϕdN
da
− ψdX
da
¸
, (64)
X +
µ
a− ∂C
∂N
¶
dN
db
+
µ
b− ∂C
∂X
¶
dX
db
= μ
∙
β − ϕdN
db
− ψdX
db
¸
. (65)
(A re-statement of the FOCs (29)-(30)). It follows that
∂WR
∂a
= EN
dN
da
+EX
dX
da
+ μ
∙
α− ϕdN
da
− ψdX
da
¸
−N,
∂WR
∂b
= EN
dN
db
+EX
dX
db
+ μ
∙
β − ϕdN
db
− ψdX
db
¸
−X,
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for some μ.
Consider now the impact on social welfare of small errors in the parameter
ϕ. By definition:
dWR
dϕ
=
∂WR
∂a
daR
dϕ
+
∂WR
∂b
dbR
dϕ
=
½
EN
dN
da
+EX
dX
da
+ μ
∙
α− ϕdN
da
− ψdX
da
¸
−N
¾
daR
dϕ
+
½
EN
dN
db
+EX
dX
db
+ μ
∙
β − ϕdN
db
− ψdX
db
¸
−X
¾
dbR
dϕ
.
Now (62) together with (64)-(65) also tells us that
0 =
∙
N +
µ
a− ∂C
∂N
¶
dN
da
+
µ
b− ∂C
∂X
¶
dX
da
¸
daR
dϕ
+
∙
X +
µ
a− ∂C
∂N
¶
dN
db
+
µ
b− ∂C
∂X
¶
dX
db
¸
dbR
dϕ
= μ
∙
α− ϕdN
da
− ψdX
da
¸
daR
dϕ
+ μ
∙
β − ϕdN
db
− ψdX
db
¸
dbR
dϕ
;
Thus
¡
dWR/dϕ
¢
simplifies to
dWR
dϕ
=
½
EN
dN
da
+EX
dX
da
−N
¾
daR
dϕ
+
½
EN
dN
db
+EX
dX
db
−X
¾
dbR
dϕ
.
Moreover the identity obtained above
0 =
∙
α− ϕdN
da
− ψdX
da
¸
daR
dϕ
+
∙
β − ϕdN
db
− ψdX
db
¸
dbR
dϕ
,
rewrites
0 =
∙
N∗ −E∗N
dN
da
−E∗X
dX
da
¸
daR
dϕ
+
∙
X∗ −E∗N
dN
db
−E∗X
dX
db
¸
dbR
dϕ
.
for the parameter values defined in (34) . Thus, at the second best, as defined
by (22)—(23) and for the parameter values defined in (34) it is
dWR
dϕ
= 0.
In words, an error on the parameter ϕ ≡ E∗N only exerts a second order impact
on welfare.
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Similarly, by definition:
dWR
dψ
=
∂WR
∂a
daR
dψ
+
∂WR
∂b
dbR
dψ
=
½
EN
dN
da
+EX
dX
da
+ μ
∙
α− ϕdN
da
− ψdX
da
¸
−N
¾
daR
dψ
+
½
EN
dN
db
+EX
dX
db
+ μ
∙
β − ϕdN
db
− ψdX
db
¸
−X
¾
dbR
dψ
.
Now (63) together with (64)-(65) also tells us that
0 =
∙
N +
µ
a− ∂C
∂N
¶
dN
da
+
µ
b− ∂C
∂X
¶
dX
da
¸
daR
dψ
+
∙
X +
µ
a− ∂C
∂N
¶
dN
db
+
µ
b− ∂C
∂X
¶
dX
db
¸
dbR
dψ
= μ
∙
α− ϕdN
da
− ψdX
da
¸
daR
dψ
+ μ
∙
β − ϕdN
db
− ψdX
db
¸
dbR
dψ
Thus
¡
dWR/dψ
¢
simplifies to
dWR
dϕ
=
½
EN
dN
da
+EX
dX
da
−N
¾
daR
dψ
+
½
EN
dN
db
+EX
dX
db
−X
¾
dbR
dψ
.
Moreover the identity
0 =
∙
α− ϕdN
da
− ψdX
da
¸
daR
dψ
+
∙
β − ϕdN
db
− ψdX
db
¸
dbR
dψ
,
rewrites
0 =
∙
N∗ −E∗N
dN
da
−E∗X
dX
da
¸
daR
dψ
+
∙
X∗ −E∗N
dN
db
−E∗X
dX
db
¸
dbR
dψ
.
for the parameter values defined in (34) .It follows that, at the second best, as
defined by (22)—(23) and for the parameter values defined in (34) it is
dWR
dψ
= 0.
In words, an error on the parameter ψ ≡ E∗X has only a second order impact
on welfare.
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